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INTRODUCTION
T HE federalization of criminal law, which began after the Civil War
and has continued unabated to the present day, has resulted in
offenses of historically local concern being placed squarely under national
jurisdiction! Starting with the Post Office Act3 and the Sherman Act4 in the
late nineteenth century, developing through the Mann Act,' the Lindbergh
Act,6 and the National Firearms Act7 in the early twentieth century, and
accelerating in the Organized Crime Control Act' and the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act9 of the 1970s,10 the federal
i Lecturer, University of Michigan Law School, and Adjunct Professor, Wayne State
University Law School. J.D. 2ooo, Harvard Law School. A note of thanks is due to Professor
Peter J. Henning, Wayne State University Law School, and David Moran, University of
Michigan Law School, for comments and critical analysis. The views expressed are those of
the author.
z See Kathleen E Brickey, CriminalMischief The Federalization of American Criminal Law,
46 HASTINGS L.J. I135, 1137 (1995). Professor Brickey recounts that at the founding, the
sum total of the federal criminal power expressly allotted to Congress was contained within
a single section of the Constitution, empowering the legislature to punish "counterfeiting..
., Piracies and other Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offensces against the Law of
Nations;" U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. io; see also Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty Years of Federalization
of Criminal Law: Sounding the Alarm or "Crying Wolf?, " 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1317, 1319-29
(zooo) (recounting the history of federal criminal law). In addition, Article III empowered
Congress to "declare the Punishment of Treason...." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
3 Post Office Act, ch. 335, 17 Stat. 283 (1872).
4 Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 2o9 (i89o).
5 White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, Pub. L. No. 276,36 Stat. 825 (191o).
6 Lindbergh Act, Pub. L. No. 189,47 Stat. 326 (1932).
7 National Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934).
8 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
9 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
1o Maroney, supra note 2, at 1327. (quoting Task Force on Federalization of Criminal law,
ABA, Report on the Federalization of Criminal Law 7 (1998))("[M]ore than 40% of the federal
criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since 1970.")
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government has steadily chipped away at "the bedrock premise that the
states carry the primary responsibility for criminal justice policy."" The
most recent and perhaps dramatic manifestation of this phenomenon is
the passage of legislation and the enactment of executive policy directives
vastly expanding the scope of federal jurisdiction in prosecuting crimes
against children. These prosecutions threaten encroachment by federal
agents on "the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal
jurisdiction." 12
Whether the federalization of criminal law is a salutary public policy
development is the subject of heated debate. 3 But beginning in 1903 with
its decision in Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case),'4 and with rare exceptions
such as United States v. Lopez" and United States v. Morrison,16 the United
States Supreme Court overwhelmingly has affirmed Congress's use of its
Commerce Clause 7 authority to expand federal criminal powers. 8 To date,
the circuit courts of appeals have followed suit in the child exploitation
arena.
19
With the grant of increased jurisdictional authority, as well as augmented
resources, law enforcement efforts to combat crimes against children have
focused principally on three areas: (1) the production, distribution, and
i i Rachel E. Barkow, Our Federal System of Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. ''9' 119 (2005).
12 United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396,411-12, (973) (quoting United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336,349 (197 )).
13 Critics of the expansion of federal criminal powers "point to its unrelenting growth;
the political and institutional incentives that drive the persistent passage of new crime leg-
islation; the increasing severity of associated sanctions; and the fact that the federal criminal
law already encroaches on the province of state criminal law in indefensible ways." William
S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Why Punish? Corporate Crime and Making Amends, 44 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 1307, 1318 n.2 (2007); see also Barkow, supra note I at 124 (arguing "[b]ecause of the
many advantages of the states' control over crime, the federal role in criminal law enforcement
should be limited to those areas in which it has a decided advantage over the states, such as
when crimes are truly national in scope or when state regulation would impose externalities
on other states").
14 Champion v. Ames, I88 U.S. 321, 363-364 (1903) (upholding the constitutionality of
the 1895 Federal Anti-Lottery Act).
15 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding invalid the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 199o).
16 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking down the civil remedy
provision of the Violence Against Women Act).
17 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. i.
I8 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (upholding the Controlled Substances
Act as applied to local marijuana growers).
19 See, e.g., United States v. Chambers, 441 E3d 438, 455 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting
Commerce Clause challenge to child pornography statutes); United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d
73, 79 (4th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Jeronimo-Bautista, 425 E3d 1266, 1273 (ioth
Cir. zoo5) (same); United States v. Holston, 343 F3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2003) (same); United
States v. Rodia, 194 E3d 465,468 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Robinson, 137 F3d 652,656
('st Cir. 1998) (same).
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receipt of child pornography; 0 (2) interstate (or international) travel for
purposes of sex with minors;"' and (3) sex trafficking of children (i.e. child
prostitution).
2
In all three spheres, the principal investigative technique used by law
enforcement is the "sting," an undercover operation in which agents pose
as wrongdoers to gather evidence and thereby apprehend criminals.3 In
the ordinary case, a child pornography investigation begins with the seizure
of a host computer, putting databases in law enforcement's hands. This
action allows for the identification of tens of thousands of potential targets,
whose names appear on subscriber and customer lists, and who are then
ensnared by law enforcement fronts soliciting orders for prohibited images.
24
Similarly, "traveler" cases typically start with a sex tourist unwittingly
making contact with either an undercover travel Web site" or an agent
posing as a parent, selling a son or daughter for sex. 6 Child prostitution
rings are infiltrated most commonly when officers acting as "johns" locate
minors working as escorts, often leading to the arrest of the ringleaders. 7
In prosecuting child predators, it remains necessary that federal
authorities establish at least some jurisdictional connection sufficient
to warrant federal charges. The lack of any federal nexus, after all,
is necessarily a bar to prosecution in the national courts. In light of an
20 i8 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), zz5z(a)(z), 2252A(a)(2) (zoo6).
21 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423(b), (e) (2oo6).
22 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), 2423(a) (2oo6).
23 See Andrew Carlon, Note, Entrapment, Punishment, and the Sadistic State, 93 VA. L. REv.
io8i, 1134 n.12 (2oo7) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DIcrIoNRY 1454 (8th ed. 2004)).
24 "Operation Emissary," a 2005 sting run by Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
has resulted in at least 26o arrests in forty-four states, including about a dozen defendants
who have been previously convicted of sex offenses against minors. See Andrea Alexander,
Cub Scout Leader Faces Child Porn Charge, TFE RECORD (BERGEN COUNTY, N.J.), Dec. 29, 2007,
at Ao3.
"Project Looking Glass," the undercover operation at issue in Jacobson v. United
States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992), discussed infra Part Ill(C) is another example. See Amy Tridgell,
Newsgathering and Child Pornography Research: The Case of Lawrence Charles Matthews, 33 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 343,372 (zooo).
Advocates of federal efforts to concentrate the national criminal power on consumers
of child pornography argue that doing so has the potential not only to punish but to prevent
crimes against children. A 2007 government study of convicted internet offenders housed at
the Federal Correction Instituion in Butner, N.C. - those serving time for non-contact of-
fenses - concluded that 85% had committed acts of sexual abuse against minors for which
they had never been charged. See Julian Sher and Benedict Carey, FederalStudy Stirs Debate on
Child Pornography's Link to Molesting, N.Y. ITMES, July 19, 2007, at Azo (discussing the Butner
study).
25 See United States v. Mayer, 503 F3d 740, 745-47 (9th Cir. 2007).
26 See Complaint at 2, United States v. Atchison, No. 07-20463, (E.D. Mich. Sept. 17,
2007).
27 See John Diedrich, Cragslist Child Sex Ads Lead to Arrests, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr.
9, 2oo8, at AI.
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expansive congressional mandate, however, the greater threat to federalism
is not the absence of jurisdiction, but rather, overreaching by agents. This
overreaching results in the artificial manufacturing of jurisdiction so as
to bring defendants, whose crimes implicate exclusively state and local
concerns, into federal court. First recognized thirty-six years ago, 8 the
manufactured jurisdiction defense - the contours and availability of which
have been the subject of a long-running circuit split - threatens to become
a staple of child exploitation prosecutions.
This article examines the applicable jurisprudence, considering
claims of manufactured jurisdiction (which may better be referred to as
"jurisdictional entrapment"), and creates a framework for the doctrine's
application to law enforcement's present-day efforts to combat child
exploitation. Following this Introduction, Part I summarizes the recent
expansion of federal jurisdiction over crimes against children and the
increased resources available to prosecute those crimes. Part II reviews
the body of existing case law considering manufactured jurisdiction - from
the doctrine's inception in United States v. Archer9 in 1973, its retrenchment
in the 1980s and 1990s, and its evolution in United States v. Wallace3" to
a tripartite arrangement of government conduct defenses - alongside
entrapment and due process outrageousness. Part III examines the handful
of appellate cases considering manufactured jurisdiction specifically in the
child exploitation context and studies a sample of recent stings by law
enforcement agents around the country. Part IV concludes by developing
a set of guideposts for law enforcement to apply in engineering future
undercover operations in order to protect against claims of jurisdictional
entrapment.3
28 United States v. Archer, 486 Ezd 670,681-82 (2d Cir. 1973).
29 Id.
30 United States v. Wallace, 85 E3d io63, io65-66 (2d Cir. 1996).
31 It is worth noting at the outset two issues that bear some relationship to the design
of child exploitation stings in general, and manufactured jurisdiction in particular, but that
are not addressed beyond this note, principally because there is no significant jurisprudential
dispute about their resolution. The first concerns the permissible use of fictitious child "vic-
tims" developed by federal agents as part of elaborate ruses to ensnare sex predators. The
federal circuit courts have been unanimous in holding that the absence of a genuine minor
is no bar to prosecution or conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 5io E3d 433, 441 (4th
Cir. 2007); United States v. Hicks, 457 F3d 83 8,841 (8th Cir. zoo6) (holding that "a defendant
may be convicted of... travelling] in interstate commerce with the purpose of engaging in
criminal sexual conduct with a person believed to be a minor regardless of whether such per-
son is actually a minor"); United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F3d 458, 469 (3d Cir. 2oo6) (same);
United States v. Sims, 428 F3d 945, 959-60 (1oth Cit. 2005) (same); United States v. Vail, No.
03-10347, 2004 WL 1257695, at * (9th Cit. June 7, 2004) (same); United States v. Root, 296
E3d 1222, 1231-32 (1 ith Cir. 2ooz) (same).
The second relates to the constitutionality of a statute that prohibits not a completed sex
crime, or even the attempt to commit one, but the act of traveling with the prohibited purpose
of later committing an illegal act. The law at issue provides that "[a] person who travels in
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I. THE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND RESOURCES TO COMBAT
CHILD EXPLOITATION
Congress first criminalized the manufacture, distribution, receipt, and
possession of child pornography in the Protection of Children Against
Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977,32 with relatively minor amendments
coming in crime and appropriations bills in 1984, 3 1986, 34 1988, 31 1990, 3
1994, 31 and 1996. 31
The past decade, however, has brought with it a mammoth expansion
of both the number of federally prosecutable child exploitation offenses
and the resulting penalties. The Protection of Children from Predators
Act of 1998 added interstate coercion, enticement, and shipment of
obscene material to minors as federal crimes, as well as increased penalties
for the interstate transportation of minors, child pornography, and repeat
offenders. 39 The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000
extended federal jurisdiction over child prostitution to include any case "in
or affecting interstate commerce."'' The 2003 Prosecutorial Remedies and
Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act
eliminated the statute of limitations, mandated a supervised release term of
interstate [or foreign] commerce ... for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct
with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or
both." i8 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2oo6). Thus, the statute punishes a state of mind when combined
with an act - interstate travel - sufficient to trigger a jurisdictional nexus, even in the circum-
stance of an undercover sting where the target's intent is aimed at a non-existent minor. See
Julie Buffington, Note, Taking the BallandRunning With It: U.S. v. Clark and Congress's Unlimited
Power Under the Foreign Commerce Clause, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 84 1, 846-49 (zoo6). Here, too, the
federal courts have spoken with a single voice, rejecting constitutional challenges to the travel
statute. See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 513 F3d 59, 6o-6I (2d Cir. 2008); Tykarsky, 446
E3d at 469; United States v. Frank, 486 F Supp.2d 1353, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2007); United States
v. Brockdorff, 992 F. Supp. 22, 25 (D.D.C. 1997).
32 Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub.L. No. 95-225,92
Stat. 7 (1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006)).
33 Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2oo6)).
34 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 704, 100
Stat. 1783-75 (1986); Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 704, 1oo Stat. 3341-75 (1986).
35 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. IOO-69o, §§ 7511, 7512, 102 Stat. 4485,
4485-86 (1988).
36 Crime Control Act of 199o, Pub. L. No. io1-647, § 3563, 104 Stat. 4818, 4928 (199o).
37 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
6oo i , io8 Stat. 1796, 1973 (1994).
38 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-2o8, §§ 4, 5, 110
Stat. 3009-30 (1996).
39 Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 105-314, §§
102, 103. 202, 401, 502, 112 Stat. 2974, 2975-80 (1998).
40 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 1o6-386, § i12,
114 Star. 1464, 1487 (2000) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7109 (2oo6)).
2009-20101
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at least five years (up to life), and increased penalties for the overwhelming
majority of child exploitation offenses.4 The 2006 Adam Walsh Act made
it possible to prosecute a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
(RICO) - style "child exploitation enterprise,"" created the federal sex
offender registration and notification program, and established a rebuttable
presumption in favor of pretrial detention for defendants charged with
crimes against children.43 The Effective Child Pornography Prosecution
Act of 200744 and PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008,4 both signed into
law in 2008, expanded the scope of federal jurisdiction in child pornography
cases, made it a crime to view child pornography web sites even where
no downloading or printing of images takes place, and prohibited the live
electronic transmission of sexually exploitive conduct.'
For their part, the Justice Department and other federal law enforcement
components have both helped drive congressional efforts expanding
federal jurisdiction over child exploitation offenses and been responsive in
implementing such legislative enactments when passed. In February 2006,
the Department of Justice launched Project Safe Childhood, a $47 million
initiative (appropriated by Congress for fiscal year 2007 alone)47 to integrate
federal, state, and local efforts, under the leadership of each district's United
States Attorney's Office, to prevent and prosecute Internet-based crimes
against children. 4" The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) - responsible
for referring about half of all child exploitation defendants for prosecution
- now lists the fight against online predators and other forms of cyber-
crime as its third highest criminal priority, behind only counterterrorism
and counterintelligence and ahead of such mainstays as public corruption,
organized crime, and civil rights.49 And in addition to the FBI, the Secret
41 Pub. L. No io8-2I, §§ 101, 103, 105, 202, 117 Stat. 65o, 652-53 (2003).
42 18 U.S.C. § z25zA(g) (zoo6). As an assistant United States attorney in the Eastern
District of Michigan, the author secured the first trial conviction nationwide under this stat-
ute, convicting Robert C. Daniels, a/k/a "The Motor City Mink," of sundry child prostitution
offenses arising from a national prostitution ring and resulting in a sentence of thirty-five
years' imprisonment for the defendant. See Judgment of Case, United States v. Daniels, No.
08-20213 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2009). The views expressed with respect to the case are solely
those of the author.
43 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2oo6, Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ III-
131, 204,205, 216,701, lzo Stat. 587, 591-94,613, 617,647 (zoo6).
44 Effective Child Pornography Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, §§ 101-203, 122 Stat.
4001, 4001-04 (2008).
45 PROTECT Our Children Act of 2oo8, Pub. L. No. i i0-4oi, §§ 101-503, 122 Stat.
4229,4229-53 (zoo8)..
46 Effective Child Pornography Act §§ 101-203; PROTECT Our Children Act §§ iot-
503.
47 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act § 143.
48 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: Project Safe Childhood (Sept.
23, 2oo8), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2oo8/September/o8-opa-845.html.
49 FBI, Quick Facts, http://www.fbi.gov/quickfacs.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2oo9).
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Service, the United States Postal Inspection Service, and even Immigration
and Customs Enforcement have become major players in the fight against
child exploitation."
Increased attention from these agencies has led to a corresponding
expansion in the number of federal prosecutions for sex-related offenses
against children. In 1994, 313 child exploitation defendants - defined
to include those charged with child pornography, sex transportation, and
sex abuse crimes - were prosecuted by United States Attorney Offices
nationwide."' Only twelve years later, in 2006, the number of prosecutions
had risen more than six-fold to 2,039.5
More prosecutions have been accompanied by longer sentences. The
average federal prison term for individuals who possess, receive, or share
child pornography has more than doubled, from three years in 1994 to more
than seven years in 2006.13
II. MANUFACTURED JURISDICTION AND OTHER GOVERNMENT CONDUCT
DEFENSES
The concept of manufactured jurisdiction in the federal criminal context
was first recognized in United States v. Archer, " a 1973 decision authored by
Judge Friendly. The defense quickly took root in the Fourth, Fifth, and
Tenth Circuits but was rejected in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals. It came to maturity in 1996, in United States v. Wallace,5"
where the Second Circuit devised a three-prong framework for considering
government conduct defenses, partnering manufactured jurisdiction with
entrapment and due process outrageousness.5 6 The defense continues to
be raised, particularly in child exploitation cases.
50 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMBATING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: FEDERAL AGENCIES
COORDINATE LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS, BUT AN OPPORTUNITY EXISTS FOR FURTHER
ENHANCEMENT 2 (2002).
51 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN FROM MARK MOTIVANS
& TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEX EXPLOITATION OFFENDERS, 2006
(Dec. 2007), http://www.ojp.usdoj.govbjs/pub/ascii/fpcseoo6.txt.
52 Id. Even with this six-fold increase, child exploitation prosecutions represented only
about z.5% of the 83,148 defendants charged in federal courts nationwide. Id. Given the high
priority now placed on these cases by the Department of Justice and the various federal law
enforcement agencies, this percentage can be expected to increase substantially over the next
several years.
53 Amir Efrati, Making Punishments Fit the Most Offensive Crimes: Societal Revulsion at Child-
Pornography Consumers Has Led to Stiff Prison Sentences- and Caused Some Judges to Rebel, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 23, zoo8, at A14.
54 United States v. Archer, 486 E2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
55 United States v. Wallace, 85 E3d I63 (2d Cir. 1996).
56 Id. at io66.
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A. United States v. Archer andIts Progeny
In United States v. Archer,57 agents from a precursor to the Drug
Enforcement Agency - the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs -
took on a corruption investigation of the Queens County District Attorney's
Office.58 Undercover agents fabricated a fictitious gun case against one of
their own, then paid an assistant prosecutor $15,000 to arrange for a grand
jury to return no indictment against him.59 The assistant district attorney
who accepted the bribe, along with a criminal defense lawyer who facilitated
the payoff and others, were charged with violating the Travel Act.60 The
statute prohibited the use of "any facility in interstate or foreign commerce
with intent to... carry on ... any unlawful activity," including bribery.
61
The sole basis on which the government asserted federal jurisdiction
was a series of interstate and international telephone calls between the
undercover officer pretending to be the target of bogus gun charges and
the defense lawyer responsible for delivering the bribe to the crooked
prosecutor.6 The calls were initiated by the agent solely for the purpose of
creating a jurisdictional nexus for a Travel Act prosecution.
63
Concerned that "[flederal auxiliary criminal jurisdiction has spread
to the point where there is practically no offense within the purview of
local law that does not become a Federal crime if some distinctive Federal
involvement happens to be present," the Second Circuit reversed the
convictions.64 The telephone calls at issue were "a casual and incidental
occurrence," "a matter of happenstance," and, perhaps most significant to
the court, "served no purpose that would not have been equally served
by a call from New York; the [agent's location was] a matter of complete
indifference to [the defendants]. ' 6 In sum, Judge Friendly concluded,
Congress could not have intended to include within the Travel Act's
57 Archer, 486 Ezd at 670.
58 Id. at 672-74.
59 Id.
6o I8 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (1970).
61 Id. at §§ 1952(a)(3), (b)(i)(2).
62 Archer, 486 Fzd at 674.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 678 (internal quotations and citations omitted). A decade later, Chief Justice
Rehnquist would echo these sentiments, cautioning that the "federalization of criminal law
threatens to overwhelm the federal justice system." Brickey, supra note 2, at 1136 (citing
Hon. William H. Rehnquist, 1993 Year-End Report on the Judiciary 4-5, reprinted in The
Third Branch (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1994, at i, 3; Hon. William H.
Rehnquist, 1992 Year-End Report on the Judiciary 1, 3-4, reprinted in The Third Branch
(Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1993, at i-3; Hon. William H. Rehnquist, 1991
Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 5, reprinted in The Third Branch (Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1992, at 1, 3).
65 Archer, 486 Fzd at 682-83 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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purview "a telephone call manufactured by the Government for the precise
purpose of transforming a local bribery offense into a federal crime." 66 Such
"manufactured jurisdiction is a reflection on the federal judicial system and
brings it into disrepute.
67
Twelve years later, in 1985, the Fourth Circuit relied on Archer to
reverse a Hobbs Act68 conviction in United States v. Brantley.69 There, in
another corruption sting, an undercover FBI agent paid off a small-town
South Carolina magistrate and a local sheriff to look the other way while
he launched an underground casino.70 Federal jurisdiction was premised
on transportation of gambling tables and equipment for the gaming
establishment by agents from FBI headquarters in Quantico, Virginia.7
"[F]ederal agents may not manufacture jurisdiction by contrived or
pretensive means," the court held.7" "[W]hen the jurisdictional predicate is
based upon acts of undercover agents, the matter should be examined with
greater than ordinary care, and that contrived activity by such agents may
not satisfy the requirement."' 3 Applying this heightened level of scrutiny,
the Fourth Circuit found that "[iut was wholly unnecessary for the FBI to
move gambling equipment from Virginia to South Carolina, or to have its
agents pretend to gamble and to purchase whiskey. We do not think the ...
predicate for federal jurisdiction can be found in such pretense on the part
of federal agents."74
In 1991, the Fourth Circuit affirmed its Brantley holding in United
States v. Coates.5 In that case, the defendant unwittingly solicited an FBI
informant to kill his stepbrother in an inheritance dispute. 6 The federal
murder-for-hire statute prohibited the "use [of] any facility in interstate
or foreign commerce, with intent that a murder be committed ... ."' To
create a jurisdictional nexus, an FBI agent posing as a hit man "went just
over the Maryland line into Virginia, concededly for the sole purpose of
making an interstate telephone call to [the defendant]."'' 8 The Fourth
Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that "there is no doubt here that,
66 Id. at 68 i.
67 Id. at 682.(internal quotations and citation omitted).
68 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1948) (prohibiting any act that "obstructs, delays, or affects com-
merce... [by] extortion").
69 United States v. Brantley, 777 E2d I59, 163 (4th Cir. 1985).
70 Id. at I6I.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 163.
73 Id. (citing United States v. Archer, 486 Ead 670, 681-82 (2d Cit. 1973)).
74 Brantley, 777 Ead at 163.
75 United States v. Coates, 949 F.2d 104, io6 (4th Cir. 1991).
76 Id. at 105.
77 18 U.S.C. §1958(a) (2o6).
78 Coates, 949 E2d at 105.
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by the government's candid admission, [the agent acted] solely to create a
federal crime out of a state crime.
79
In addition to the Second and Fourth Circuits, two other circuits
recognized the existence of a manufactured jurisdiction defense soon
after Archer, while rejecting it on the specific facts before them. In United
States v. Garrett,80 another Travel Act bribery case involving union and city
council leaders in Texas, the Fifth Circuit held that the law "forbid[s]
[a] government agent's movement out-of-state for the sole purpose of
manufacturing ... jurisdiction.""1 The jurisdictional entrapment defense
was rebuffed in Garrett, however, because the defendants themselves
initiated the interstate calls at issue, which "facilitated the unlawful bribery
activity within the meaning of the Act, following and as a consequence of
which the bribe money was actually paid.""2 In United States v. O'Connor,'
which involved the smuggling of stolen uranium, the Tenth Circuit
acknowledged that the law prohibits "virtual entrapment," by which
federal law enforcement "provoke[s] interstate activity that [the defendant]
might not have otherwise done,"' but held that the interstate activity at
issue in the case "was an integral rather than an incidental aspect of the
transaction."
85
B. Rejection and Retrenchment
Unlike the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth circuits, other circuit courts
have flatly rejected Archer and the concept of jurisdictional entrapment.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, for one, simply "refused to apply the
Archer rule."8 6 "The course of decisions casts doubt," the Seventh Circuit
held in UnitedStates v. Podolsky7 - in which agents steered the defendant to
burn a particular property, then charged him with arson of a building used
in interstate commerce 88 - "on the vitality of the independent principle
79 Id. at io6.
80 United States v. Garrett, 716 F.zd 257 (5th Cir. 1983).
81 Id. at 267.
82 Id. at z66.
83 United States v. O'Connor, 635 E2d 814 (0oth Cir. i98o).
84 Id. at 817.
85 Id. at 88.
86 United States v. Burdette, No. o2- 59 15 , 2oo4 WL 93946, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. I6, 2004),
(citing United States v. Graham, 856 E2d 756, 76o-61 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that "[c]ontrary
to the defendant's protestations, the Travel Act does not distinguish between 'initiated' and
'returned' telephone communications")).
87 United States v. Podolsky, 798 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1986).
88 j8 U.S.C. § 844(f)(i) (1988) (stating that "[wlhoever maliciously damages or destroys,
or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or
other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affect-
ing interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years and not more
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announced [in Archer] that forbids the 'manufacture' of federal jurisdiction
in circumstances not constituting entrapment and not canceling any
element of the crime such as criminal intent." 9 The Eleventh Circuit,
noting Podolsky, concluded in United States v. Petit,9° a stolen electronics case,
that "federal courts have been extremely reluctant to set aside convictions
on the sole basis of the principle announced in Archer."91
The Petitcourt went on to question whether limiting the reach of federal
statutes by recognizing a jurisdictional entrapment defense was even an
appropriate exercise of judicial power: "The decision to involve federal,
as opposed to state, resources was made within the bounds of political,
rather than judicial, discretion. The government possesses broad discretion
in determining whom to prosecute, subject to constitutional constraints
prohibiting the exercise of such discretion based on race or other invidious
grounds."9
Yet several years after Judge Posner tried to put an end to claims of
manufactured jurisdiction in Podolsky, another Seventh Circuit panel
recognized that "the possibility that a case might arise where federal
jurisdiction would be inappropriate because it was 'manufactured' has
not been completely foreclosed."93  Thereafter, while recognizing the
existence of the doctrine, a series of decisions in the Seventh Circuit and
elsewhere rejected jurisdictional entrapment claims on their facts where
the "defendant freely participates in the jurisdictional act," regardless of
government instigation or involvement.94
Consequently, a stolen goods conviction was affirmed in United States
v. Peters,9' despite the defendant having moved interstate solely at the
direction of federal agents, because he "freely and voluntarily drove
his stolen truck from Illinois to Indiana." 96 Likewise, in United States v.
Gardner,97 another stolen goods conviction was upheld, even though the
jurisdictional element was satisfied only when the defendant traveled from
New York to Chicago to deliver purloined treasury bills, and "[tihe sole
purpose for meeting [the defendant] in Chicago was [for federal agents] to
arrange for the disposition of the securities."'98 Regardless, the court held,
"The Government merely afforded the opportunity, and the defendant
than 20 years....").
89 Podolsky, 798 Ezd at 181.
90 United States v. Petit, 841 F.2d 1546 (1 ith Cir. 1988).
91 Petit, 841 E2d at 1553.
92 Id. at 1554.
93 United States v. Peters, 952 F.zd 960, 963 (7th Cir. 1992).
94 Id. at 963 n.6.
95 Peters, 952 F.2d at 960.
96 Id. at 963.
97 United States v. Gardner, 596 E2d 334 (7th Cir. 1975).
98 Id. at 344.
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chose to seize it. '  Expounding the same principal in United States v.
Skoczen, 1"0 a cigarette smuggling case, the court rejected a manufactured
jurisdiction defense because "the government merely was afford[ing] the
opportunity and facilities for the commission of the offense charged; the
participants were awaiting any propitious opportunity, and never considered
themselves limited by boundaries."''
C. United States v. Wallace: RaisingManufacturedJurisdiction Alongside Other
Government Conduct Defenses
The Second Circuit revisited Archerin 1996. In United States v. Wallace,"0 2
a defendant stealing from the State of New Jersey Teachers' pension fund
was convicted of bank fraud'03 after ten of the checks stolen from the state
fund were deposited in a Citibank account.' 4 Jurisdiction for the federal
charge was premised on Citibank's status as an FDIC-insured financial
institution.0 '
Confronted with the defendant's claim of manufactured jurisdiction,
the Second Circuit sought to assemble the various strands of post-Archer
authority and to bring manufactured jurisdiction within a global framework
of defenses focused on prohibited government conduct:
[T]he "manufactured jurisdiction" concept is properly understood not as
an independent defense, but as a subset of three possible defense theories:
(i) the defendant was entrapped into committing a federal crime ..; (ii)
the defendant's due process rights were violated because the government's
actions in inducing the defendant to commit the federal crime were
outrageous; or (iii) an element of the federal statute [involving volitional
conduct by the defendant] has not been proved, so federal courts have no
jurisdiction over the crime.'
°6
Although positing manufactured jurisdiction as a "subset" of other
defenses, Wallace, in fact, created a tripartite structure in which jurisdictional
99 Id.
too United States v. Skoczen, 405 F 3 d 537 (7th Cir. 2005).
ioi Id. at 544 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
102 United States v.Wallace, 85 F3d 1o63 (2d Cir. 1996).
103 I8 U.S.C. § I344 (1988) ("Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a
scheme or artifice (i) to defraud a [federally-insured] financial institution; or (2) to obtain
any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the
custody or control of, a [federally insured] financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises; shall be fined not more than $I,ooo,ooo or imprisoned
not more than 30 years, or both.").
1o4 Wallace, 85 F3d at Io64-65.
105 Id. at io65.
io6 Id. at io65-66 (internal citations omitted).
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entrapment may be raised alongside the two traditional government conduct
defenses of entrapment and outrageousness. Indeed, as explained below,
because the holdings of Archer, Brantley, and Coates cannot be justified
under either entrapment or outrageous government conduct theories, those
rulings can be accounted for only by resort to this third defense, which
the Wallace decision conceived as being available where "an element of
the federal statute [involving volitional conduct by the defendant] has not
been proved, so federal courts have no jurisdiction over the crime."' 107
1. Entrapment.- To see that Archer, Brantley, and Coates cannot be
rationalized as instances of entrapment or outrageous government conduct,
it is first necessary to spend a moment defining those defenses. A claim of
entrapment, initially put forward in the prohibition-era case of Sorrells v.
United States,'l s consists of "two related elements: government inducement
of [a] crime and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to
engage in the criminal conduct." 109
The classic case is Jacobson v. United States."0 After the defendant
ordered a then-legal nudist magazine featuring underage boys, he was
targeted in a child pornography sting by the Postal Inspection Service and
the Customs Service."' Almost three years later, and after "26 months
of repeated mailings and communications from Government agents and
fictitious organizations," the defendant sent off for a pornographic magazine
depicting young boys engaged in various sexual activities.'2
Finding strong evidence of government inducement - more than
two years of titillating correspondence before any law was broken, and no
evidence of predisposition - and because the nudist magazine ordered
by the defendant that led authorities to hone in on him was legal when
he purchased it, the Supreme Court reversed defendant's conviction:
"Government agents may not originate a criminal design, implant in
an innocent person's mind the disposition to commit a criminal act,
and then induce commission of the crime so that the Government may
prosecute." 13
107 Id.
io8 Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); see also Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and
the Problem of Deterring Police Misconduct, 37 CONN. L. REv. 67, 86 (2004) (tracing the history
of the entrapment defense); Barry R. Temkin, Deception In Undercover Investigations: Conduct-
Based vs. Status-Based Ethical Analysis, 32 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 123, 143 (2008) (discussing the
"long history" of law enforcement's use of deception).
1o9 Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988); see also Richard H. McAdams, Essay,
Reforming EntrapmentDoctrine In United States v. Hollingsworth, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1795, 1796
(2007) (discussing elements of an entrapment claim).
S11o Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
i 11 Id. at 542-46.
112 Id. at 55o.
113 ld. at 548.
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The entrapment defense established in Sorrells and applied in Jacobson,
however, has no place inArcher, Brantley or Coates. The corruption prosecuted
in Archer"14 and Brantley"5 predated the law enforcement stings at issue, and
the homicidal brother-in-law in Coates"6 solicited an informant to commit
murder in the first instance. This clear-cut evidence of predisposition on
the part of the defendants forecloses any possible claim of entrapment.17
2. Outrageous Government Conduct.- As to the due process defense of
outrageous government conduct, first recognized by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Russell,118 the doctrine warrants reversal only where
"the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process
principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial
processes to obtain a conviction." 119
Nonetheless, claims of outrageous government conduct have gained
little traction in the thirty-six years since the principle was announced.2
Best described by the First Circuit in UnitedStatesv. Santana,' "The banner
of outrageous misconduct is often raised but seldom saluted."22 "[In only
a small handful of ... cases has the government's conduct actually been
held to be outrageous." 113 Indeed, to the dismay of some commentators,
the Sixth Circuit and others have apparently abolished it altogether.'
4
114 United States v. Archer, 486 F.d 670,673-74 (2d Cit. 1973).
115 United States v. Brantley, 777 F.zd 159, 161 (4th Cir. 1985).
1I6 United States v. Coates, 949 F.2d 104, 105 (4th Cir. 1991).
117 Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1997).
118 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
i19 Id. In Russell, the Supreme Court confronted the covert infiltration of a metham-
phetamine ring in which an undercover agent supplied the defendant with a necessary com-
ponent to manufacture the drug. Id. at 425-26. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
finding no outrageousness in the case before it, but recognized circuit court lines of authority
that prohibited law enforcement from becoming so "enmeshed in the criminal activity that
the prosecution of the defendants [is] repugnant to the American criminal justice system." Id.
at 428, 435-36 (internal citations omitted).
120 Indeed, as argued by Professor Peter J. Henning, Chief Justice Rehnquist tried to
retract his prior acceptance of an outrageousness defense in Hampton v. United States, 425
U.S. 484,488-89 (1976). "Once spoken, however, the apparent recognition of a separate due
process right to be free from governmental misconduct in investigating a crime could not be
recanted so easily." Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct In Grand Jury Investigations, 5 1
S.C. L. REv. 1, 34 (1999).
121 United States v. Santana, 6 E3d i (st Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Gamble, 737
E2d 853,857 (ioth Cir. 1984) ("The defense that the government's conduct was so outrageous
as to require reversal on due process grounds is often raised but is almost never successful").
122 Santana, 6 F3d at 4.
123 United States v. Mosley, 965 E2d 906, 911 (ioth Cir. 1992). In a 1998 survey, one
commentator found that "only the Third and Ninth Circuits have actually invoked [outra-
geousness] to dismiss an indictment." Kenneth M. Lord, Entrapment and Due Process: Moving
Toward a DualSystem of Defenses, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 463, 5 i o 0(1998).
124 Jason R. Schulze, Note, United States v. Tucker: Can the Sixth Circuit Really Abolish the
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At a minimum, this "extraordinary defense [is] reserved for only
the most egregious circumstances" where the challenged conduct is
"shocking, outrageous, and clearly intolerable." ' 5  Nothing about law
enforcement's behavior in Brantley (establishing a covert gambling den)
or Coates (pretending to put a would-be killer in contact with a hit man)
meets this standard or exceeds the bounds of traditional undercover work.
And while some courts have sought to write off Archer as an outrageousness
case, ' it is axiomatic that a defendant cannot claim outrageousness where
government agents either "infiltrate an ongoing criminal enterprise" or
"induce a defendant to repeat or continue a crime or even ... expand or
extend previous criminal activity."'2 7 Therefore, for the same reason an
entrapment defense fails - because Archer involved an ongoing corruption
racket to which the defendant was necessarily predisposed - outrageous
government conduct likewise cannot succeed.
3. Manufactured Jurisdiction.- If Archer, Brantley, and Coates cannot be
explained as either entrapment or outrageous government conduct, this
leaves only the last of Wallace's "three possible defense theories," where
"an element of the federal statute [involving a volitional act by the
defendant] has not been proved, so federal courts have no jurisdiction over
the crime."'2 8 It is under this rubric where all Archer claims rightly fall
and where Wallace properly lines up the post-Podolsky2 9 line-of-authority
allowing a manufactured jurisdiction defense only where there is no
"link between the federal element and a voluntary, affirmative act of the
defendant." i30
In Archer 3 ' and Coates,131 federal jurisdiction was premised on interstate
telephone calls initiated by law enforcement, not by the defendants. In
Brantley, the jurisdictional nexus was the FBI's interstate transportation of
gambling equipment, without the defendants' knowledge or involvement. 13
In contrast, in Wallace, the manufactured jurisdiction defense was rejected
because while federal agents engineered the use of Citibank to deposit
stolen state pension fund checks, the defendant then independently called
Outrageous Government Conduct Defense? 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 943,944-45 (i996).
125 Mosley, 965 E2d at 91o.
iz6 See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 85 E3d io63, io66 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that "the
government's conduct in Archer ... arguably could have supported a due process claim of
outrageousness").
127 Mosley, 965 E2d at911.
128 Wallace, 85 E3d at 1o65-66.
i29 United States v. Podolsky, 798 F2d 177 (7th Cir. 1986).
130 Id. at io66.
131 United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 673-74 (2d Cir. 1973).
132 United States v. Coates, 949 E2d 104, 105 (4 th Cir. 1991).
133 United States v. Brantley, 777 Ezd 159, 161 (4th Cir. 1985).
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the FDIC-insured bank to confirm the deposit and ordered an accomplice
to withdraw funds. 34 "Unlike the conspirators in Archer, who never agreed
to make any interstate phone calls, Wallace and his coconspirators clearly
undertook to ... withdraw money from Citibank. The jurisdictional element
was therefore an essential part of the conspiratorial agreement [and] all of
the statutory elements have been met." 131
In sum, three conflicting lines of authority have emerged in
manufactured jurisdiction doctrine post-Wallace. First: the Sixth 13 6 and
Eleventh 37 Circuits appear to reject outright claims of jurisdictional
entrapment. Second: the Fourth Circuit, never having limited (much less
overruled) Brantley or Coates, seemingly takes the broadest view, creating a
subjective test focused on the intent of law enforcement: a "predicate for
federal jurisdiction can [not] be found in ... pretense on the part of federal
agents,"'' 38 nor may law enforcement act "solely to create a federal crime
out of a state crime."' 139 Third: the majority view, set out by the Second,"4
Third,'4' Fifth, 4 ' Seventh,143 Ninth,'" and Tenth Circuits, 145 stakes out a
middle ground, conditioning claims of jurisdictional entrapment on the
objective conduct of the defendant: whether he "voluntarily and of his
own free will did the act that caused the interstate element to exist,
' 146
regardless of whether that act was instigated by federal agents or if they did
so exclusively for the purpose of supplying a federal jurisdictional nexus.
134 United States v. Wallace, 85 E3d io63, 1o66-67 (2d Cir. 1996).
135 Id.
136 United States v. Burdette, No. 02-5915, 2004 WL 93946, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 16,
2004).
137 United States v. Petit, 841 F.2d 1546, 1555-54 (11th Cir. 1988).
138 Brantley, 777 Ed at 163.
139 United States v. Coates, 949 E2d IO4, io6 (4th Cir. i991).
140 Wallace, 85 F3d at IO66.
141 United States v. Faison, 679 E2d 292, 295 (3d Cir. 1982) (describing how "Faison
took advantage of interstate communication to effectuate his plan and coordinate the various
players' actions").
142 United States v. Clark, 62 F3d 110, 114 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[Tlhe defendant voluntarily
and of his own free will did the act that caused the interstate element to exist.").
143 United States v. Peters, 952 F.2d 960, 963 n.6 (7th Cir. 1992).
I44 United States v. Bagnariol, 665 Ed 877, 898 (9 th Cir. 1981) ("[W]hether the defen-
dant or government takes the initiative is a substantial difference.").
145 United States v. O'Connor, 635 F.2d 814, 817 (0oth Cir. i98o) ("The FBI agents did
not provoke interstate activity that O'Connor might not otherwise have done.").
146 Clark, 62 E3d at 114.
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III. MANUFACTURING JURISDICTION TO CATCH CHILD PREDATORS
Only a handful of appellate-level decisions nationwide have considered
claims of manufactured jurisdiction in the child exploitation context. In
each case, a federal agency established a physical or electronic "storefront"
- a type of "reverse sting" in which agents pose as purveyors of contraband
rather than its consumers' 47 - trading in material exploiting children or the
facilitation of sex acts with children. As described below, the interstate (or
international) character of the front operation was readily apparent in each
case and the defendants freely participated in wrongdoing, knowing full well
the multi-jurisdictional nature of their misconduct. As a result, Wallace's
objective standard was met and the defendants' claims of manufactured
jurisdiction summarily were rejected.
These lessons seemingly have been well-learned by federal agencies
executing child exploitation stings around the country. A sample of recent
cases demonstrates the use of both globally accessible storefronts and
more narrowly focused, but equally effective, "lemonade stands" placed
in electronic environments known to be frequented by child predators.
A final case, United States v. Al-Cholan,1 8 reveals the potential dangers of
not using these techniques and instead devising ad hoc settings to target
individual defendants.
A. Manufactured Jurisdiction in Child Exploitation Cases
1. Child Pornography.- A number of appellate decisions have considered
undercover operations aimed squarely at the purveyors of child
pornography. In United States v. Schatt,149 the United States Customs Service
developed an undercover Internet Web site advertising child pornography
purportedly available overseas.'50 After the defendant placed an order and
was convicted of receiving child pornography,' the Tenth Circuit rejected
his claim of manufactured jurisdiction: "The evidence shows that Schatt
knowingly ordered pornographic videotapes from a source outside the state
of Oklahoma."'
147 William J. Stuntz, Essay, Race, Class, andDnugs, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1795, 1842 n.107
(1998).
148 Judgment in a Criminal Case at I, United States v. Al-Cholan, 07-20562 (E.D. Mich.
Nov. 11, 2007).
149 United States v. Schatt, No. 99-6317, 2000 WL 35846o, at *(i oth Cir. Apr. 7, 2000).
150 Id. at*i.
15I 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (1994) (prohibiting the knowing receipt or distribution of any
visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct "using any means or facility
of interstate or foreign commerce or that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported
in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials which have been
mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means ... .
152 Schatt, 2000 WL 358460, at *2.
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The Schatt storefront was patterned on United States v. Goodwin,'53 in
which the Postal Inspection Service formed the "Far Eastern Trading
Company, Ltd. of Hong Kong" as a sham child pornography mail order
firm.' s4 The authorities chose Hong Kong, after obtaining permission
from the local government, because a substantial quantity of prohibited
images originated there.'55 In Goodwin, the defendant placed an order for
contraband featuring minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct and was
convicted of receiving child pornography.'56 His claim of manufactured
jurisdiction was rejected by the Fourth Circuit noting the "use of the mails
was an entirely necessary element of the undercover operation, which was
national in scope."' 57
So, too, in United States v. Esch, 5 the Postal Inspection Service created
a fictitious organization known as "Love Land," headquartered at a post
office box in Colorado, and solicited images of child pornography.'5 9 After
a group of defendants shipped homemade pictures to the postal box, they
were convicted of manufacturing child pornography' 60 and the Tenth
Circuit again rejected the resulting manufactured jurisdiction claim. In
doing so, the court held "[defendants] consistently expressed a willingness
153 United States v. Goodwin, 854 E2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988).
154 Id. at 34.
155 Id.
156 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).
157 Goodwin, 854 E2d at 37 n.3.
158 United States v. Esch, 832 F.zd 531 (ioth Cir. 1987).
159 Id. at 533-34.
16o 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (1982) ("Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, en-
tices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage
in.. .any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such
conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (d), if such person knows or has rea-
son to know that such visual depiction will be transported in interstate or foreign commerce
or mailed.. .or if such visual depiction has actually been transported in interstate or foreign
commerce or mailed").
On October 30, 1998, Congress greatly expanded the jurisdictional reach of the statute
prohibiting the manufacture of child pornography. Prior to that date, production of prohibited
visual depictions could be prosecuted federally only if the illicit material either was trans-
ported in interstate commerce or mailed (or if the defendant knew or had reason to know that
they would be). See id. In passing the Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of
1998, Congress added as a jurisdictional basis the manufacture of prohibited images "using
materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by
any means, including by computer .... " Protection of Children From Sexual Predators Act
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-314, § 201, 112 Stat 2974, 2977 (1998). One of the purposes of the
amendment "was to extend the statute to cases where proof of the interstate transportation
of the depictions, or proof of the pornographer's knowledge as to the interstate transportation
was absent." United States v. Holston, 343 F3d 83,86 (2d Cir. 2003). Thus, so long as it could
be established that some part of the illicit matter was produced with extra-territorial materi-
als - the camera (or its component parts), film, paper, computer discs, etc. - there would be
federal jurisdiction.
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to correspond through interstate mailings and to send sexually explicit
photographs through the mail. Further, the defendants' production of the
sexually explicit photographs, with the knowledge that the photographs
would be mailed, constituted activity which represented an integral, rather
than an incidental or unforeseen, aspect of the criminal transaction."
' 161
2. Child Sex Tourism.- In addition to child pornography, other appellate
courts have weighed in on stings aimed at child sex tourists. In United
States v. Mayer,61 the defendant purchased tickets to Mexico through an
FBI-constructed travel Web site.16 Correspondence with an undercover
agent established that the defendant intended to go to Mexico to have sex
with young boys." Defendant was arrested while traveling to Mexico and
later convicted of travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct.
16
His claim of manufactured jurisdiction was rejected by the Ninth Circuit:
"Here, traveling to another country, where access to young boys would be
easier, was part of the plan from inception to execution. Interstate travel was
an integral part of the crime itself, and not contrived simply to guarantee
federal jurisdiction."T6
Similarly, in UnitedStates v. Roberts,167 "the defendant... responded to an
advertisement in a newspaper for Costa Rica Taboo Vacations, a fake travel
agency run by federal investigators trying to crack down on commercial
sex operations between Costa Rica and Florida."' ' After the defendant
used a credit card to pay an undercover agent for two underage Costa
Rican prostitutes, he was convicted of attempting to engage a minor for
commercial sex purposes. '6 9 The Eleventh Circuit rejected his jurisdictional
entrapment claim: "The government did not manufacture jurisdiction
over Roberts's conduct, because it was not solely responsible for placing
Roberts's money into interstate commerce. Roberts chose to pay with a
credit card rather than a cashier's check, and thus created the possibility
that his payment would be processed by a bank in another state."17'
x61 Esch, 832 E2d at 539.
162 United States v. Mayer, 503 E3d 740 (9th Cit. 2007).
163 Id. at 747.
164 Id.
165 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (zoo6) ("A person who travels in interstate commerce or travels
into the United States, or a United States citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence
in the United States who travels in foreign commerce, for the purpose of engaging in any illicit
sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
30 years, or both.").
i66 Mayer, 503 E3d at 755.
167 United States v. Roberts, No. 05-12217, 2006 WL 827293, at * i (I I th Cir. March 30,
2oo6).
168 Id. at *476.
169 I8 U.S.C. § 1594(a) (2oo6).
17o Roberts, 2006 WL 827293, at *3.
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B. Undercover Child Exploitation Stings" 1
A sample of five recent child exploitation cases demonstrates that
federal law enforcement has generally - but not entirely - assimilated
the lessons taught in Archer, Wallace, and elsewhere to avoid claims of
jurisdictional entrapment. Four of the cases involved storefront scenarios
akin to those sanctioned in Schatt, Goodwin, Esch, Mayer, and Roberts, while a
fifth concerned the particularized targeting of a defendant and concomitant
design of an improvised sting that mirrored some of the difficulties present
in Archer, Brantley, and Coates.
1. Storefronts: United States v. Shutts and United States v. Buelow.-
Spinning off the travel agency described in Roberts, FBI agents in Miami
engineered another storefront targeting child sex tourists in United States
v. Shutts7 and United States v. Buelow. 1' 3 Advertising both online and in
adult magazines, the FBI front, "Latin America Pleasure Tours," promised
travelers to Costa Rica "clean, fun-loving companion[s] of varying ages for
your pleasure vacation."' 7 4 In Shutts, the defendant paid either $600 or
$2,100 for the sexual services of a 14-to-15-year-old prostitute and was
arrested en route to Costa Rica from Rochester, New York. 7' In Buelow, the
defendant likewise paid for "a minor escort of 14-15 years of age," after
soliciting "photographs of minors between the ages 10-11 years old to see
if [he] wanted to arrange any sexual services with them."' 7 6 The defendant
was arrested during an airport layover in Atlanta.'77
A Miami district court quickly disposed of Schutts' manufactured
jurisdiction claim. Finding that the "Idjefendant purposefully delivered
a money order through the U.S. Postal Service to a post office box in the
Southern District of Florida to effectuate his criminal activity [and used]
the telephone to call law enforcement in this District," the court held
that "[elven if we could consider the illusory concept of manufactured
171 As an assistant United States attorney in the Eastern District Michigan, the au-
thor was the lead prosecutor on two of the cases discussed in this section, United States v.
AI-Cholan, 07-20562 (E.D. Mich. 2007) and United States v. Buelow, 07-20150 (E.D. Mich.
2007). The views expressed with respect to these cases are solely those of the author.
172 United States v. Shutts, No. 07-20816-CR, 2007 WL 4287666, at *i (S.D. Fla. Dec.
5, 2007).
173 United States v. Buelow, No. 07-60084 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (transferred via FED. R. CRIM.
P. 20 to the Eastern District of Michigan).
174 Shus, 2007 WL 4287666, at *i.
175 Id. The Government's motion in the case suggested that the defendant paid $2oo,
while a law enforcement agent's probable cause affidavit noted the defendant paid $6oo. Id.
at *i n.3.
176 Sentencing Memorandum at i, United States v. Buelow, No. 07-CR-201 50 (E.D.




jurisdiction, we would not have applied it in this case."178
In Buelow, no claim of manufactured jurisdiction was asserted because
the defendant pled guilty soon after indictment to charges of attempted
travel to engage in illicit sexual conduct, 17 9 waiving both jurisdictional
claims and appellate rights. 180 He was sentenced to 140 months (just under
twelve years) imprisonment. 8' Given the factual similarities between
Buelow, Roberts, and Schutts, however, there is every reason to believe any
such claim would have been rejected.
2. Lemonade Stands: United States v. Brockdorff and United States v.
Atcheson.- A different kind of storefront from those in Schutts and Buelow
- perhaps better described as an electronic "lemonade stand" offering
up an individual child rather than a corporate-style travel agency - was
developed by a Maryland-based undercover federal agent in United States
v. Brockdorff82 and by a Macomb County, Michigan, sheriff's detective in
United States v. Atchison. 83
In Brockdorff, a federal agent posing as a thirteen-year-old and using
the America Online screen name, "Britneyluv," was contacted by the
defendant, a NASA engineer.184 During the course of several electronic and
telephonic conversations, Brockdorff told the agent he wanted to meet and
have sex with her thirteen-year-old persona and sent a sexually suggestive
photograph of himself. 85 The agent agreed to meet and, despite (or because
of) the fact that both she and Brockdorff were located in Maryland, set
the rendezvous at the Mazza Gallerie, a shopping mall located one block
over the Maryland/District of Columbia border."8 When he arrived, the
defendant was arrested and charged with traveling in interstate commerce
to engage in illicit sexual conduct.
8 7
178 Shutts, 2007 WL 4287666, at *2-3. The Miami court's hesitation to even consider a
jurisdictional entrapment defense is consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's apparent failure to
recognize one. See United States v. Petit, 841 Fzd 1546, 1553-54 (1 ith Cir. 1988).
179 18 U.S.C. § 2423(e) (2006) ("Whoever attempts or conspires to [travel in interstate
commerce or travel into the United States, or a United States citizen or an alien admitted for
permanent residence in the United States who travels in foreign commerce, for the purpose of
engaging in any illicit sexual conduct] shall be punishable in the same manner as a completed
violation....").
18o Plea Agreement at 9, United States v. Buelow, No. o7-CR-2o150 (E.D. Mich. Nov.
21, 2007).
181 Judgment at 2, United States v. Buelow, No. 07-20150 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 12, 2008).
182 United States v. Brockdorff, 992 FSupp. 22, 23 (D.D.C. 1997).
183 Second Amended Complaint at 2, United States v. Atchison, No. 07-20463 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 17, 2007).






Relying on the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Clark,""5 the D.C. District
Court rejected Brockdorff's claim of manufactured jurisdiction: "Here,
although the government chose Mazza Gallerie for the sole puro0se. of
creating a federal offense, Mr. Brockdorff voluntarily went there, knowing
that he was crossing a state line. The Court finds that he did so at the risk
of being subject to any laws based on crossing that line."'"
Like the federal agent in Brockdorff, a county sheriff's deputy fashioned
an undercover online persona in United States v. Atchison, 19o by posing as
a Michigan mother selling her five-year-old child for sex on a Web site
believed to be frequented by child predators. 191 After two weeks of
instant message chats in which the defendant, an assistant United States
attorney from Gulf Coast, Florida, solicited a variety of sex acts with the
five-year-old, he flew to Detroit, where he was arrested after disembarking
a Continental Airlines flight. 9 He was charged with enticement' 93 -and
travel to engage in illicit sexual conduct.' 94
The defendant in Atchison never put forth a manufactured jurisdiction
defense because within weeks of being charged, he committed suicide
while in federal custody awaiting trial. 19 But, as in Buelow, and for the
reasons discussed in Mayer, Schutts, Brockdorff, having freely traveled to
Michigan, there is little reason to think that Atchison could have prevailed
on a jurisdictional entrapment claim.
3. Ad hoc chicanery: United States v. AI-Cholan.- A manufactured
jurisdiction defense was offered in United States v. Rahib Al-Cholan.'" The
defendant, a ten-year Iraqi army veteran formerly stationed with tank and
artillery units in Baghdad and Basra, immigrated to the United States in
1995.191 In 2007, as in Coates, AI-Cholan unwittingly solicited a federal
188 United States v. Clark, 62 F3d 110, 114 (5th Cir. 1995).
189 Brockdorff, 992 ESupp. at 26.
19o Second Amended Complaint, United States v. Atchison, No. 07-20463 (E.D. Mich.
2007).
191 Id. at 2.
192 Id. at 3-4.
193 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2oo6) ("Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of
interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has
not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any
person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this
title and imprisoned not less than 1o years or for life.").
194 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).
195 David Ashenfelter & Amber Hunt, Sex Case Ends in a Suicide; Federal Prosecutor
Chargedrwith Tryingto Lure TotHangs Self, DEROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 6,2007, at NWS i.
196 Judgment in a Criminal Case, supra note 147, at I.
197 Detention Order at z, Al-Cholan, No. 07-20562 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 13, 2007).
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informant, here seeking to buy sex with a child. 9 AI-Cholan admitted to
the informant that he had molested at least 100 children in Iraq and had
trolled the streets of Dearborn in a green minivan, trading food, toys, and
small sums of cash for sex acts with minors he picked up outside a drug
store.
99
Over a handful of days, federal agents assembled a makeshift sting
targeting AI-Cholan. The informant told the defendant that a man was
offering to sell his twelve-year-old niece for sex in Toledo, Ohio. z°° After
first complaining that his van was inadequate to make the sixty-mile
journey, AI-Cholan agreed to go when the cooperator said he would supply
transportation."0 '
After being driven to Ohio and paying an undercover agent posing
as the girl's uncle $110 in the Toledo hotel's parking lot, Al-Cholan was
arrested and charged with interstate travel to engage in an illicit sex act."02
He was convicted at trial and sentenced to 112 months' (just under ten
years) imprisonment.0 3
Before sentencing, Al-Cholan argued in a new trial motion that "there
was [no] reason for the Defendant to be transported across the Michigan/
Ohio border except so as to create federal jurisdiction and there is a
complete dearth of any evidence as to any volitional determination by the
Defendant to cross the state border .... ",,z04 Although precisely parroting
the language of a manufactured jurisdiction claim required by Wallace,
Al-Cholan's attorneys failed to offer any authority to support it and the
argument was rejected by the district court without significant analysis.0 '
The case is on appeal.z" 6
On the surface, there is much in Al-Cholan to raise jurisdictional
entrapment concerns. As in Archer, placing the fictitious twelve-year-old
in Toledo "served no purpose that would not have been equally served
by" putting her in Michigan; her location was "a matter of complete
indifference to" AI-Cholan. 07 To paraphrase Brantley and Coates, the
"predicate for federal jurisdiction [was] found[ed on the] pretense of
198 Id.
199 United States v. AI-Cholan, No. 07-20562, 2oo8 WL 5102252, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich.
Dec. 1, 2007).
2oo Detention Order, supra note 196, at 2.
zo Id.
202 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).
203 Judgment in a Criminal Case, supra note 147, at 2.
204 Motion for New Trial at 3-4, United States v. A--Cholan, 07-20562 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
i, 2oo8).
2o 5 Order denying Motion for Retrial at 3, United States v. Al-Cholan, 07-20562 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 2, 2o08).
2o6 United States v. AI-Cholan, No. 08-20532 (6th Cir. Mar. 4, 2008).
207 United States v. Archer, 486 Ezd 67o, 682-83 (2d Cit. 1973).
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federal agents," ' 8 who acted "solely to create a federal crime out of a state
crime.'"" Furthermore, as the Tenth Circuit cautioned against in O'Connor,
federal agents surely "provoke[d] interstate activity that [AI-Cholan] might
not have otherwise done." 10
Yet the heady language of those early opinions has given way to the
practical reality of Wallace and subsequent decisions. Thus, even if the A/-
Cholan verdict was not insulated by the Sixth Circuit's refusal to recognize
a manufactured jurisdiction defense,"' the conviction would still stand.
Even though federal agents engineered the sting for the precise purpose
of creating an interstate nexus, it was Al-Cholan that agreed to be driven
to Toledo and that paid for sex with a child, thereby "voluntarily and of his
own free will [doing] the act that caused the interstate element to exist." '
Like the sex tourist in Brockdorff, "although the government chose
[Toledo] for the sole purpose of creating a federal offense, [A1-Cholan]
voluntarily went there .. . crossing a state line.... [H]e did so at the risk
of being subject to any laws based on crossing that line." '13 Similar to the
cigarette smugglers in Skoczen, "the government merely... afford[ed] the
opportunity and facilities for the commission of the offense charged; [Al-
Cholan was] awaiting any propitious opportunity, and never considered
[himself] limited by boundaries." ' 4
IV. DEVELOPING UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS TO AVOID CLAIMS OF
JURISDICTIONAL ENTRAPMENT
A review of manufactured jurisdiction case law, as well as consideration
of a recent sample of cases involving child exploitation stings, has allowed
for the development of a set of guideposts for future federal undercover
law enforcement operations - generally applicable but appropriate to
child exploitation cases in particular - to avoid claims of jurisdictional
entrapment.
First, storefront operations accessible by all members of a criminal
underground (and often by the public at large) should be used in place of
ad hoc stings targeting individual defendants. The undercover website in
Schatt, the mail order firm in Goodwin, the pro-pornography organization
in Esch, and the travel websites in Mayer, Roberts, Shutts, and Buelow were
2o8 United States v. Brantley, 777 Fzd I59, 163 (4th Cir. 1985).
209 United States v. Coates, 949 Fzd 1o4, 1o6 (4th Cir. '99').
zIo United States v. O'Connor, 635 E2d 814, 817 (ioth Cir. I98O).
211 United States v. Burdette, No. 02-5915, 2004 WL 93946, at * 1, *4-5 (6th Cir. Jan I6,
2004).
212 United States v. Clark, 62 F3d 110, 114 (5th Cir. 1995).
213 United States v. Brockdorff, 92 F.Supp. 22, z6 (D.D.C. 1997).




universally inclusive environments with which persons seeking an outlet
for exploitative behavior could (and did) make contact. The "lemonade
stands" used by the Maryland agent in Brockdorffand by the sheriff's deputy
in Atchison, advertising conjured up thirteen- and five-year-olds, served
the same purpose and achieved the same result. In contrast, makeshift
stings targeting a particular dirty prosecutor in Archer, a specific corrupt
sheriff in Brantley, and an individual deranged killer in Coates led to those
convictions being reversed, while the focus on a particular pedophile in Al-
Cholan provided fertile ground for a claim of manufactured jurisdiction.
Second, and related to the first point, the storefront should make its
interstate (or international) character obvious and plain. A defendant doing
business with the Far Eastern Trading Company, Ltd. of Hong Kong"' s or
Latin America Pleasure Tours'1 6 would find it hard to pretend that he did
not "freely participate[] in the jurisdictional act." ' 7
Of course, storefront operations are inherently passive. By their nature,
they must await contact from a universe of unknown subjects rather than
seeking evidence against a particular target. As a result, in cases where a
defendant contacts someone who, unknown to him, is cooperating with
authorities and seeks to execute a criminal design - a murder-for-hire in
Coates, sex with a child in Al-Cholan - use of a storefront becomes more
difficult and may perhaps be impractical. In such cases, an increased
focus on the remaining guideposts discussed herein becomes even more
important.
What is best required under such circumstances is that law enforcement
agencies, perhaps working in concert, have developed preexisting storefronts
across a range of illegal industries to which the informant can funnel a
willing target. Since the operatives carrying out a reverse sting often will
be "burned" in the course of an arrest and subsequent prosecution, the
storefront (or lemonade stand) need not be extravagant or complicated but,
instead, should be easily replicable.
By way of example, pedophiles often seek legal outlets for their sexual
deviance. An undercover agent positioned in a strip club - cast as a
manager with reputed access to underage girls - could over time become
a fixture in the underground community trading in child sex and serve as
a trap for informant-derived targets. So when information is developed
that a particular individual warrants the potential surrender of this valuable
undercover resource, he can be steered to the agent, who will offer the
target a "menu" of underage girls, all located out-of-state, on an Indian
reservation or other territorial jurisdiction of the United States."1 8 Because
215 United States v. Goodwin, 854 E2d 33,34 (4th Cir. 1988).
216 Sentencing Memorandum at i, United States v. Buelow, No. 07-20150 (E.D. Mich.
Jan. 15, zoo8).
217 United States v. Peters, 952 F.2d 960, 963 n.6 (7th Cir. 1992).
218 18 U.S.C. § 7(9) (2oo6) (defining "territorial jurisdiction" of the United States).
2009-20101
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the defendant will then "freely and voluntarily"21 9 travel to the bait, and
because the agent will have been in place long before the particular
defendant was targeted, any jurisdictional entrapment claim will be
foreclosed.
Third, law enforcement should seek to develop evidence of a target's
independent volition, detached from law enforcement, to act in interstate (or
international) commerce or, where applicable, to use the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce in committing the crime. In United States v. O'Connor,
the uranium smuggling case, the defendant "demonstrated a willingness to
sell to any buyer, regardless of the possibility of interstate transactions."2 0
In United States v. Peters, a truck thief "showed no reluctance in joining a
conspiracy that would result in his stolen truck being transported out of
Illinois" and "made it clear to Agent Poole that he desired to engage in
ongoing interstate criminal activity."2 2 ' And in United States v. Faison, the
defendants used interstate "telephone conversations between Mancuso in
New Jersey and Faison at his place of business in New York" to conspire
to deposit stolen checks as part of their fraud scheme.22 In contrast, the
absence of such evidence forced futile reliance on solitary calls initiated by
federal agents, dooming the prosecutions in Archer and Coates.
Fourth, even where there is limited evidence of "jurisdictional
predisposition" - i.e. prior instances in which the defendant crossed a state
or national boundary to commit the charged offense - federal agents should
gather evidence of the defendant's generic predisposition to commit
similar crimes. Such evidence will not only defeat a classic entrapment
defense but one of jurisdictional entrapment as well. Al-Cholan, in which
the defendant admitted to molesting children in Iraq before immigrating
to the United States and many more after arriving in Dearborn, Michigan,
is a good example.2 3 In the face of such evidence, there is little that
Al-Cholan or similarly situated defendants can do to rebut the argument
that a government sting merely "afforded the opportunity and facilities
for the commission of the offense charged; the participants were awaiting
any propitious opportunity, and never considered themselves limited by
boundaries.
2 4
Fifth, federal agents constructing a sting should include an interstate
nexus, by design, as an integral component of, rather than a mere incident
to, the anticipated wrongdoing. A child pornography operation, for instance,
219 Peters, 952 E2d at 963.
220 United States v. O'Connor, 635 E2d 814, 817 (ioth Cir. i98o).
221 Peters, 952 F.zd at 963.
222 United States v. Faison, 679 F.2d 292, 294 (3d Cir. 1982).
223 United States v. AI-Cholan, No. 07-20562, 2008 WL 5102252, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich.
Dec. 1, 2008).




must be set up so that orders are placed and prohibited images shipped
through the mails or by Internet, rather than delivered in-person, thereby
making such instrumentalities "an entirely necessary element of the
undercover operation." "I The child pornography stings in Schatt, Goodwin,
and Esch all met this standard and were sanctioned by courts as a result.
Lastly, and of overriding importance, the defendant must be made to
"freely participate[] in the jurisdictional act," regardless of the instigation or
involvement required by law enforcement."2 6 This was the critical missing
element in Archer, Brantley, and Coates. In contrast, the defendants in
Wallace, Faison, Schatt, Goodwin, and Esch were all made to take advantage
of the tools and instrumentalities of interstate commerce to consummate
wrongdoing. So, too, the defendants in Clark, Gardner, Peters, O'Connor,
Mayer, Roberts, Shutts, Buelow, Brockdorff, Atchison, and Al-Cholan, unlimited
by boundaries, were all made to cross state and national borders, thereby
making "[i]nterstate travel ... an integral part of the crime itself." ' 7 As a
result, regardless of the sometime pervasive prodding by law enforcement
in these cases, all these ultimately were blessed by courts as "not contrived
simply to guarantee federal jurisdiction." 8
As Wallace and other decisions have held, it is only this last guidepost
- the commission of a voluntary jurisdictional act by the defendant - that is
essential to push back a charge of manufactured jurisdiction, at least in the
overwhelming majority of circuits. Whether the free exercise of volition in
consummating a jurisdictional act remains both a necessary and sufficient
condition in government conduct jurisprudence, in the face of potential
judicial resistance against ever-expanding federal encroachment on
areas traditionally reserved to state and local authorities, remains an open
question. At a minimum, as Professor Daniel Richman has cautioned, "That
courts can play only a limited role in patrolling federal criminal jurisdiction
as a statutory or constitutional matter ... does not mean that they cannot
contribute significantly to making federal authorities more accountable for
their enforcement choices."2 9 To avoid any retrenchment by the courts
in judging claims of jurisdictional entrapment, therefore, undercover law
enforcement operations should seek to capture as many of the guideposts
enumerated above as possible when developing stings targeting child
predators and others.
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